Concluding Remarks
What you achieved, what went wrong, what you learned, what it is worth commercially, and what should happen next.
Chapter 7 closes the loop. It goes back to the four objectives set in Chapter 1 and marks each one against the evidence. Then it does four things that carry real marks: admits the problems, reflects honestly, draws out the business implications, and says what should happen next.
Pages 115 to 121.
The four objectives, marked
Objective 1, identify the current challenges Accomplished
Met through two independent surveys plus thematic analysis of the free-text answers, checked against the literature.
The evidence shows the failure is recurrent, not exceptional. 92.5 percent of organisers and 82.8 percent of travellers hit it at least sometimes.
The dominant traveller complaint is not that events go unadvertised. It is that the information available is incomplete, unclear or stale, at 47.2 percent. That then forces direct contact with the property in 33.3 percent, and produces a delay during which the opportunity is lost in 16.7 percent.
On the organiser side the dominant theme is coordination breakdown from last-minute change at 46.4 percent, with turnout mismatch producing waste in 21.4 percent.
So the deficit is one of information integrity, not information volume. That sentence reframes the entire problem, and it is the single best thing to quote from this chapter.
One organiser described an event where turnout fell short and, in their own words, resources went to waste and the expense was larger than the profit. That is the precise operational consequence Chapter 1 predicted, said by somebody who lived it.
Objective 2, analyse the statistical relationships Accomplished
The full analytical chain was executed on both samples independently: reliability with purification, descriptives, correlation, and simultaneous regression with collinearity and independence diagnostics.
The result was consistent across two independently recruited groups. All three predictors correlate strongly with the outcome at the bivariate level, in identical rank order. In regression, only centralized information access contributes uniquely.
The finding is not that real-time visibility and pre-booking do not matter. Both correlate strongly with the outcome.
The finding is that their contribution operates through unified information access rather than independently of it. So a platform that delivers visibility or booking without unifying the underlying record would implement the two capabilities that carry no unique effect while omitting the one that does.
Objective 3, design and develop the prototype Accomplished
Chapter 5 documents it. The requirement that distinguishes it from every platform reviewed in Chapter 2 is that the unified information layer is a physical property of the schema, not a presentation convention. One inventory table, one availability column, one subscription, one transactional path.
This design is a direct consequence of Objective 2. Had the regression identified real-time visibility as the dominant predictor, a different architecture would have followed.
If you can say that sentence and mean it, you have demonstrated that your software chapter and your statistics chapter are one piece of work rather than two.
Objective 4, evaluate performance and adoption intent Partially accomplished
Two halves, and they land differently.
The adoption half is complete
Organiser adoption intent is positive at 3.719 out of 5. Willingness to try it for a real event at 3.850. Willingness to recommend it to other properties at 3.900. Traveller adoption intent is higher still at 3.945.
And critically, the thematic analysis identified the conditions attached to that intent, which were converted into specified non-functional requirements rather than left as sentiment.
The functional half is complete, except one thing
All 10 functional test cases and all 6 measured non-functional targets passed, including the central concurrency claim.
What was not accomplished is usability evaluation with real participants, which leaves NFR-06 specified but unverified.
Problems encountered, reported without minimising
Four of them. Knowing all four, and being able to state them calmly, is worth more than any defence you could improvise.
- The achieved sample fell well short of the plan 64 travellers and 40 organisers, against a design of 350 and 50. A combined 104 rather than 400. The organiser sample stays proportionally strong at roughly half the qualifying properties in the collection belt. The traveller sample is both small and narrow: 62 of 64 were domestic travellers and all were aged 18 to 34. The consequence: the traveller model is adequately powered to detect a large effect and underpowered for a small one, which is why the non-significant coefficients are reported as a failure to detect rather than as evidence of absence. The findings generalise to the domestic young-adult segment, not to international visitors.
- Both reverse-coded items failed psychometrically Items 7 and 20 returned negative corrected item-total correlations on both instruments, depressing initial reliability to 0.159 for the organiser outcome scale. The standard remedy was applied and reported in full, lifting every scale to an acceptable level. The likely cause is a documented method factor, plausibly worsened by respondents answering in a second language. The lesson, stated in the chapter: negatively worded items carry a real risk of measuring reading direction rather than construct position in this setting.
- The development window was compressed Prototype construction ran against a deadline that left no room for a usability panel, which is why Objective 4 is only partly accomplished. The evaluation that was conducted was prioritised towards the claims that could not be established any other way, concurrency integrity and access control, rather than spread thinly across everything.
- The outcome could only be measured as perceived, not realised Because the artefact did not exist in the field at survey time, Coordination Effectiveness was captured through behavioural intention as a proxy grounded in the Technology Acceptance Model. A defensible measurement decision, but it is a proxy. The study cannot claim to have measured actual improvement in procurement accuracy or attendance.
Self-reflection
This section is often skimmed by students and read carefully by examiners. Yours has a genuinely strong story in it.
The most valuable thing this study produced was a result I did not expect. At proposal stage I assumed all three capabilities would contribute, with real-time visibility likely dominant, because visibility is the most visible failure to anyone standing in Mirissa on an event night.
The data said otherwise, and said it twice, in two independent samples. Learning to treat that as the finding rather than as a problem with the data was the single most useful shift in the project.
The temptation to report the bivariate correlations, which support all three hypotheses handsomely, and to pass over the regression, was real, and it was resisted.
What the project taught, beyond the result
The study required moving between three kinds of work that are usually taught separately: instrument design and psychometrics, statistical inference, and software architecture. The connection between them turned out to be the substance of the project rather than an administrative sequence.
The clearest example: the decision to generalise three resource categories into one table is not a technical preference. It is the regression result expressed in a schema. Being able to trace a line from a survey item, through a beta coefficient, to a database table, to a test case, is a capability no single module teaches.
The three steep learning curves
Reliability is a diagnostic, not a formality
It is not a box to tick on the way to the interesting results. It can invalidate an entire instrument, and it nearly did here.
Concurrency cannot be verified by reading
The gap between code that looks correct and code that is correct under contention is not visible by inspection. It has to be provoked.
Stating limitations strengthens the work
The least expected one. Naming your own weaknesses before an examiner finds them initially felt like weakening the thesis. It turned out to do the opposite.
Business insight
Four points, and they are more specific than "there is a market for this". Each one is constrained by evidence rather than freely chosen.
- The wedge is the information layer, not the booking engine Since centralized information is what drives adoption intent in both samples, a product entering this market should lead with the unified listing and live availability, not with transaction features. This also lowers the barrier to getting hotels on board: a property can be listed and useful before it ever processes a payment through the platform.
- The pricing model is constrained by the evidence, not free to choose Organiser item 23, that cost matters more than feature count, returned a mean of 3.600, and cost transparency appeared in 40.0 percent of adoption answers. A per-property subscription is the wrong instrument for a market where 62.5 percent of properties are below mid-size. A commission on completed bookings, or a free listing tier with paid transaction handling, aligns the cost to the operator with the value they actually receive and removes the fixed outlay that would block adoption.
- Trust has to be manufactured deliberately Demonstrated results and reviews from other operators appeared in 43.3 percent of adoption answers. One organiser said plainly that they would want to run a small or low-risk event with it before trusting it with something large. So: launch on a small number of visible reference properties rather than broad simultaneous acquisition, and build a product affordance that lets an operator trial it on one low-stakes event.
- The realistic initial market is bounded and reachable Roughly 60 to 80 qualifying properties in the primary collection belt. Small enough to be addressed directly, and dense enough that a traveller-facing listing becomes useful once a modest fraction of them participate, which is the condition any two-sided platform must reach to be viable at all.
Future recommendations
Six of them. Each one answers a limitation, so they are easy to remember if you pair them up.
| Recommendation | Fixes which limitation |
|---|---|
| Measure realised coordination effectiveness, not perceived. Deploy across a season and measure procurement variance against actual attendance, the proportion of events running under capacity, and advance turnout prediction accuracy, each against a pre-deployment baseline | The outcome being a proxy |
| Extend the sample to international visitors. Test whether the dominance of centralized information holds for travellers with less local knowledge, where the expectation is that it holds more strongly | 96.9 percent domestic sample |
| Redesign the reverse-scored items or drop them. Either reword so the reversal is unambiguous in a second-language reading context, or replace the attention check with a different device | Both reversed items failing |
| Conduct the usability evaluation. A System Usability Scale study with organisers from the target properties would verify NFR-06 | NFR-06 unverified |
| Separate the sub-dimensions of the outcome. A longer instrument with enough items per sub-dimension would let Operational Performance, Decision-Making Accuracy and Booking Confidence be tested as distinct constructs | The outcome collapsing to one dimension |
| Test the architecture at larger scale. The concurrency guarantee was verified at the scale a single hotel event produces. A platform serving many properties on a peak night should re-verify the lock ordering before commercial deployment | Scale of the concurrency test |
The concluding statement
This study set out to determine how an integrated smart tourism event management system could improve coordination for hotel-hosted social events in Sri Lanka.
It found that the coordination failure in this market is a failure of information integrity rather than information volume, and that of the three candidate remedies tested, only centralized information access makes a statistically significant unique contribution, replicated independently across 64 travellers and 40 organisers.
It translated that finding into an architecture where the event record and its live availability form one authoritative source read identically by both sides of the market, built that artefact, and evaluated it against a requirement set traced back to the evidence that produced it.
The limitations are real and stated where they arise. What it establishes within those bounds is a specific and actionable claim: for small hotel-hosted events, unifying the information is not one feature among several, it is the mechanism through which the others deliver value at all.
Numbers from this chapter
If they ask you
What did you personally learn from this project?
That the most valuable result was one I did not expect. I assumed real-time visibility would dominate, because it is the most visible failure to anyone standing in Mirissa on an event night. The data said otherwise, twice, in two independent samples. Learning to treat that as the finding rather than as a problem with the data was the most useful shift in the project.
The second thing is that instrument design, statistical inference and software architecture turned out to be one continuous piece of work rather than three separate stages. The decision to put tickets, rooms and add-ons in one table is not a technical preference, it is the regression result written as a schema.
Is this commercially viable?
The evidence constrains the answer rather than leaving it open. The entry point is the information layer, not the booking engine, because a property can be listed and useful before it processes a single payment, which lowers the barrier on the supply side.
Pricing is constrained too. A fixed per-property subscription is wrong in a market where 62.5 percent of properties are below mid-size and cost ranked as the deciding adoption factor. Commission on completed bookings, or free listing with paid transaction handling, aligns cost to value received.
And the initial market is bounded and reachable at roughly 60 to 80 qualifying properties in the collection belt, dense enough that the listing becomes useful once a modest fraction participate.
What would you do differently?
Four things, all of them in Chapter 7. Start traveller collection earlier and push much harder on the international segment, which at 3.1 percent is essentially unmeasured. Reword the reverse-coded items or replace them with a different attention check. Build the artefact earlier so a usability panel fits inside the window. And use a longer instrument for the outcome so the three sub-dimensions can be scored separately instead of collapsing into one.
Has this actually improved coordination at a real hotel?
No, and the thesis does not claim it. The evaluation establishes that the artefact conforms to a specification derived from the evidence, and that the concurrency and access guarantees hold. It does not establish realised coordination effectiveness in the field.
Demonstrating that would require deploying across a season with participating properties and measuring procurement variance against actual attendance, the proportion of events running under capacity, and advance turnout prediction accuracy, each against a pre-deployment baseline. That is the first future recommendation in Section 7.5.
Chapter 7 assesses all four objectives. Three are accomplished and the fourth is partly accomplished, because usability with real participants was not evaluated. It reports four problems without minimising them: the sample shortfall, both reverse-coded items failing, the compressed development window, and the outcome being measured as perceived rather than realised. The business insight section concludes that the wedge is the information layer rather than the booking engine, and that the pricing model is constrained by the evidence rather than freely chosen. And the closing claim is that for small hotel-hosted events, unifying the information is not one feature among several, it is the mechanism through which the others deliver value at all.